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The Labour Market Story: The UK Following Recession 
Executive Summary 
• The UK economy is now returning to sustained recovery, but there is some
distance to make up after a sharp recession and a delayed return to growth.
Amidst those tough times, the rise in UK unemployment following recession was
smaller and less sustained than previous experience would suggest, and
unemployment is now falling rapidly as the economy grows.
• The most troubling aspect of the period since the onset of recession is the fall in
labour productivity, and its subsequent weakness. This has applied across
industries and seems to result from a combination of factors, including problems
of mismatch between skills supplied and demanded in the labour market.
• While the rise in unemployment was smaller than expected, it was still substantial,
and hit hardest upon those at the margins. But other problems have longer term
origins, including the decline in youth employment, rising underemployment in
terms of skills, and a falling number of jobs in traditional middle-skill occupations.
• All regions and nations within the UK have been affected by recession, but there
has been some variation, typically strengthening existing differences. On the other
hand, looking at local level within England, the experiences of different types of
area suggests traditional ‘north-south’ narratives are far from the whole story.
• The marked decline in real pay since the onset of recession (and its prior
stagnation, on some measures) is linked to the drop in labour productivity.
Additional factors such as non-wage costs of employment, and a rise in inequality
within wages, also play a part.
• Evidence through the recession continues to show that those with higher skills
and qualifications are more likely to stay employed and have substantially higher
earnings prospects.
• Policy can help by shaping education, training and employment institutions and
practices to ensure that they adapt to changing market conditions and business
needs. Arguably, policy based on government ‘pushing’ skills to employers has
not been successful. Effective policy depends on employers’ participation in
designing, implementing and engaging with the solution.
v 
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1 The UK economy: recession, recovery and 
potential 
The recession of 2008 and 2009 brought to an end the longest period of sustained, stable 
economic growth the UK has known with one of its sharpest contractions. Years of 
continued progress in closing the longstanding gap in productivity with leading advanced 
economies such as the US and Germany saw significant reverses. Recovery has taken 
longer than before, not helped by severe problems in the Eurozone, one of the UK’s 
largest export markets. While employment fared better than historic and international 
experience would have suggested, productivity has struggled to recover as the recession 
and its aftermath cast a harsh light on the weak points in the UK economy. 
1.1   Recession and recovery 
From the end of the early 1990s recession until 2008, the British economy experienced a 
continued expansion in output, alongside low and stable inflation and high and growing 
employment. Improved macroeconomic stability and increased market flexibility, 
combined with greater opportunities in a growing global economy, created benign 
conditions for growth. During the 2000s, a combination of structural weakness, 
commodity price shocks, and the arrival of a global financial crisis in 2007-08 contributed 
to falling business and consumer confidence, and an extremely sharp recession during 
2008 and 2009 (Figure 1.1). 
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Figure 1.1 UK GDP growth and economic sentiment, 2000-2013 
 
Source: ONS GDP at constant prices, SA, and European Commission ECOFIN Economic Sentiment 
Indicator 
The UK’s high profile in financial services, and close proximity to the particularly troubled 
Eurozone export markets contributed not only to the depth of the recession but also a 
weak recovery. As a consequence, at the time of writing, UK output remains below its 
pre-recession peak. 
The particular set of circumstances driving the deep recession and relatively weak 
recovery (compared to previous recessions) show through in the macroeconomic 
indicators (Figure 1.2). Clearly, the fall in confidence led to sharp cutbacks in household 
consumer expenditure and businesses’ investment plans. In particular, business 
investment has remained stalled around the lower levels seen early in the recession, 
some 20 per cent below the pre-recession peak of 2008.1 Meanwhile, while exports have 
recovered from the depths, after more than a 10 per cent fall during the recession, 
problems in key export markets including the Eurozone have restrained their role in 
powering further recovery. 
Also hinted at is one of the less expected features of recession and recovery – that the 
demand for labour did not fall along with output, and recovered much more rapidly than 
has output. Marking a departure from the UK’s recent history, the combination of a sharp 
drop in output but a mild fall in employment sets the British economy apart from many of 
the other advanced economies. 
1 It is worth noting that this was very much a peak level, as the panel in Figure 1.2 suggests; growth in business investment 
in fixed capital was limited for some years before the recession. 
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As Figure 1.3 shows, the UK’s experience across the period 2007 to 2012 is worse than 
many other leading economies in terms of output growth, but its unemployment rate 
changed only moderately; indeed, it was slightly better than the US and not much worse 
than Australia, both of which fared much better in terms of output growth. The German 
experience, of falling unemployment, has not been matched by particularly strong growth 
in output, sharing with the UK the symptoms of struggling productivity, with employment 
outpacing output. 
It is now becoming clear that starting in the second half of 2013, the UK economy began 
to reach the pace of recovery long hoped for, demonstrating across 2013 a leading 
performance among advanced economies (Figure 1.3). The return of robust business and 
household confidence (see Figure 1.1), of growing strength in asset markets (especially 
housing) and increases in household spending all point to a long-awaited recovery.  
The Office of Budget Responsibility’s (OBR) latest (March 2014) forecasts suggest GDP 
growth of 2.7 per cent in 2014 and 2.3 per cent in 2015; growth thereafter depends on 
improvements in business investment and exports raising prospects for household 
incomes. There remain substantial risks in the global economy, and significant domestic 
challenges, such as the need to consolidate the public budget deficit, to manage a 
smooth exit from unconventional monetary policy, and to tackle the supply-side weak 
points that have become clear these past few years. 
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Figure 1.2 UK macroeconomic performance since 2006 Q1 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: ONS data (2014) 
70
75
80
85
90
95
100
105
110
115
20
06
 Q
1
20
07
 Q
1
20
08
 Q
1
20
09
 Q
1
20
10
 Q
1
20
11
 Q
1
20
12
 Q
1
20
13
 Q
1
20
08
 Q
1 
= 
10
0 
Household final consumption 
expenditure 
70
75
80
85
90
95
100
105
110
115
20
06
 Q
1
20
07
 Q
1
20
08
 Q
1
20
09
 Q
1
20
10
 Q
1
20
11
 Q
1
20
12
 Q
1
20
13
 Q
1
20
08
 Q
1 
= 
10
0 
Gross domestic  
product 
70
75
80
85
90
95
100
105
110
115
20
06
 Q
1
20
07
 Q
1
20
08
 Q
1
20
09
 Q
1
20
10
 Q
1
20
11
 Q
1
20
12
 Q
1
20
13
 Q
1
20
08
 Q
1 
= 
10
0 
General government final 
consumption expenditure 
70
75
80
85
90
95
100
105
110
115
20
06
 Q
1
20
07
 Q
1
20
08
 Q
1
20
09
 Q
1
20
10
 Q
1
20
11
 Q
1
20
12
 Q
1
20
13
 Q
1
20
08
 Q
1 
= 
10
0 
Gross fixed capital formation: 
Business investment 
70
75
80
85
90
95
100
105
110
115
20
06
 Q
1
20
07
 Q
1
20
08
 Q
1
20
09
 Q
1
20
10
 Q
1
20
11
 Q
1
20
12
 Q
1
20
13
 Q
1
20
08
 Q
1 
= 
10
0 
Total exports of goods  
and services 
70
75
80
85
90
95
100
105
110
115
20
06
 Q
1
20
07
 Q
1
20
08
 Q
1
20
09
 Q
1
20
10
 Q
1
20
11
 Q
1
20
12
 Q
1
20
13
 Q
1
20
08
 Q
1 
= 
10
0 
Total weekly  
hours worked 
4 
The Labour Market Story: The UK Following Recession 
 
Figure 1.3 Change in output and unemployment across advanced economies, 2007-
2013 
 
Figure 1.4 Output growth and unemployment across advanced economies, 2013  
 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, March 2014. Advanced economies include Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, US. 
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Some of those weak points may be within the labour market. There are concentrations of 
unemployment and evidence of mismatches whether quantitative (wanting more or fewer 
working hours) or qualitative (underskilled or overskilled for jobs). For young people in 
particular, there are concerns that sustained unemployment leaves a ‘scarring’ effect (see 
e.g. Bell and Blanchflower, 2011), with a permanent loss in human capital lowering their 
future earnings and employment outcomes. 
But it remains the case that the UK labour market has been efficient in keeping people in 
work, considering the experience of recession and recovery. Unemployment has fallen 
below the seven per cent level identified as a guidepost for monetary policy by the Bank 
of England. Employment has now surpassed pre-recession peaks in terms of jobs (2012) 
and hours worked (2013). In keeping with the different experience of output growth, per 
capita output remains significantly below its pre-recession peak; and on the OBR’s 
forecasts will not surpass previous levels until 2017. 
1.2   Productivity 
In the period before 2008, the so-called ‘Great Moderation’, the UK made significant 
progress in making up the gap in labour productivity against other advanced economies 
(most notably, the US and several northern European countries). The particular 
experience of recession and recovery in the UK since 2008 brought that progress to a 
halt, and indeed reversed some of it, as UK productivity declined slightly while that of 
other nations continued to increase. 
As Figure 1.5 shows, after the recession there therefore remains a substantial gap in 
labour productivity for the UK compared with leading advanced economies. Compared 
with some of those advanced economies, the UK might consider its higher levels of 
employment a desirable trade-off. But the Netherlands, Germany and the US, each of 
which have similar or better employment rates, all have a 30 per cent or greater 
advantage in the output generated for every hour worked.  
Figure 1.6 shows that the UK’s story is marked by a stronger contrast between pre-
recession and post-recession than other advanced economies. The UK’s growth in 
productivity through the ‘Great Moderation’ was strong and sustained, outpacing even the 
US case. By contrast, many European countries had seen relatively modest growth in 
productivity in those years, and across the 2000s, Italy had barely made any gains at all. 
But where the US and Canada continued to see productivity growth through the 
recession, and countries such as France saw a return to growth after seeing a fall during 
recession, the UK changed from a high performer to stagnation. 
6 
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Figure 1.5 2012 Productivity and employment performance, advanced economies 
 
Source: ONS International Comparisons of Productivity 2012 (February 2014) and OECD Employment Rates 
by Age Group 
Figure 1.6 GDP per hour worked, 2000-2012, selected advanced economies (2007=100) 
 
Source: ONS International Comparisons of Productivity 2012 (February 2014), Table 3 
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The UK’s weak productivity performance could be seen as the consequence of its 
combination of poor output growth and resurgent employment. As a matter of simple 
arithmetic, the new highs in hours worked and a failure to surpass pre-recession peaks in 
output means labour productivity is lower. The comparable post-recession experience of 
Germany, with a less sharp recession in output, but a fall in unemployment across the 
period, supports the idea. 
There certainly seems to be some truth that during the years immediately after the 
recession hit, UK firms held on to (‘hoarded’) employees amidst constrained demand, at 
the expense of measured productivity (Martin and Rowthorn, 2012; Barnett et al., 2014). 
But given their lasting nature, changes in the composition of output and employment 
seem likely to be more a reflection of sustained adverse shocks in the UK’s terms of trade 
(Broadbent, 2014), weaknesses in reallocation of resources between firms (Barnett et al., 
2014) especially in the context of a banking crisis (Broadbent, 2012; Oulton, 2013), as 
well as measurement issues relating to the rising importance of ‘intangibles’ investment 
(Goodridge et al., 2013). As the global economy moves to a more stable growth path, and 
especially as the largest emerging economies continue to develop and increase their 
demand for the high-value services in which the UK is a leading exporter, there is 
potential for productivity growth to return to the levels of the 1990s and 2000s (Besley 
and Van Reenen, 2013). 
1.3   Competitiveness 
However, leaving aside some of the progress lost in recession and recovery, there 
remains that substantial gap between the UK’s productivity performance and those of the 
leading advanced economies. And many of those institutional weaknesses, in domestic 
markets and the way many British firms manage and operate, will continue to limit the 
success of efforts to close the gap in labour productivity. 
Given growth in the global economy, export demand for high-value products and services 
means that some of the UK’s most advanced, forward-thinking businesses will continue 
to grow and succeed. Their performance will in turn provide the basis for a solid growth 
performance across the UK economy, creating an increased demand for domestic private 
services and growing tax revenues to fund public services. 
8 
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But it is in these domestic sectors that we know that there is a ‘long tail’ of firms with 
weak management practices. Insulated in markets with limited competition and with poor 
accountability, too many of these firms ‘make do’ rather than seeking to drive continuous 
improvements and innovation. All countries have these firms; but on average, in 
management practices the UK falls behind many of those countries with similar or better 
productivity, with the difference made up by the number of poorly managed firms (Bloom 
and Van Reenen, 2010). 
Our particular concern here is with the interface between firm performance and the labour 
market. Weaknesses in productivity relate not only to the direct issue of poor 
management, but also the complex connection between the role of firms, employees and 
government in investing in human capital. The Department for Business, Innovation and 
Skills (BIS, 2012), drawing on a wide range of evidence, identifies the following 
competitive weaknesses in the UK’s workforce: 
• the quality of education in the UK is moderate, with the quality of mathematics and 
science education perceived to be low; 
• the percentage of people aged 25 to 64 years of age with below upper secondary 
education is relatively high; 
• UK workers compare unfavourably with their counterparts in the OECD with 
respect to basic numeracy and literacy skills; and 
• management capability is less well developed in the UK than in countries such as 
the USA, and UK businesses feel constrained in developing their management 
effectiveness by an inadequate supply of managerial human capital. 
As that summary suggests, the picture is mixed. Concentrating on multinational 
companies’ perceptions of the workforce available to them as they consider investment, 
recent research for BIS finds the UK ranked second out of seven countries for the overall 
skills of its workforce, just behind Germany and ahead of the USA (Tingle et al., 2014). 
Generally, the perception is that the UK workforce performs well on relevant qualifications 
and communication skills, but less well on areas such as business development, team 
working, management, or technical competence. 
Indeed, for all that there are substantial issues with the lower skill workforce, and general 
weaknesses in maths, science and management, the expansion of higher education over 
several decades has resulted in a substantial and sustained growth in the number of 
graduates available to UK businesses (Figure 1.7). Almost certainly, that has been an 
important base for the growth of the financial and business services sector, and the shift 
of UK manufacturing to focus on its high-value specialisms, although there are questions 
over how well this expanded graduate skills base is being used by employers. 
9 
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Likewise, wider perceptions of UK competitiveness suggest some weaknesses, but some 
strengths on which to build as well. For example, the World Economic Forum (2013, pp3-
4; also Table 1.1 for the top 25) finds that: 
The United Kingdom rounds out the top 10, falling by two places in this year’s 
assessment… Overall, the United Kingdom benefits from clear strengths such 
as the efficiency of its labor market (5th), in sharp contrast to the rigidity of 
those of many other European countries. The country continues to have 
sophisticated (9th) and innovative (12th) businesses that are highly adept at 
harnessing the latest technologies for productivity improvements and 
operating in a very large market (it is ranked 6th for market size). The highly 
developed financial market also remains a strength overall, despite some 
weaknesses last year. 
The UK has many well-managed firms, and has an efficient labour market and deep 
capital markets. But it has a long tail of low-performing firms operating in markets 
characterised by limited competition, a workforce characterised by general weaknesses 
in important skill areas, and a sense (explored below) that although the labour market 
gets people into work, it may be efficient in doing so, rather than effective: skills are 
variable, but enhanced skills are not always fully used in the workplace. 
Figure 1.7 Workforce qualification levels, % economically active, 2004-2013 
 
Source: ONS Annual Population Survey 
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Table 1.1 Global Competitiveness Index 2013-2014 rankings 
  GCI 2013-2014 GCI 2012-2013  
Country/Economy Rank Score Rank Change 
Switzerland 1 5.67 1 0 
Singapore 2 5.61 2 0 
Finland 3 5.54 3 0 
Germany 4 5.51 6 2 
United States 5 5.48 7 2 
Sweden 6 5.48 4 -2 
Hong Kong SAR 7 5.47 9 2 
Netherlands 8 5.42 5 -3 
Japan 9 5.40 10 1 
United Kingdom 10 5.37 8 -2 
Norway 11 5.33 15 4 
Taiwan, China 12 5.29 13 1 
Qatar 13 5.24 11 -2 
Canada 14 5.20 14 0 
Denmark 15 5.18 12 -3 
Austria 16 5.15 16 0 
Belgium 17 5.13 17 0 
New Zealand 18 5.11 23 5 
United Arab Emirates 19 5.11 24 5 
Saudi Arabia 20 5.10 18 -2 
Australia 21 5.09 20 -1 
Luxembourg 22 5.09 22 0 
France 23 5.05 21 -2 
Malaysia 24 5.03 25 1 
Korea, Rep. 25 5.01 19 -6 
Source: © 2013 World Economic Forum | www.weforum.org/gcr 
The UK continues to enjoy the advantages of being an advanced economy, including a 
relatively efficient labour market. While their productivity growth is impressive, leading 
emerging economies such as the BRIIC countries2 offer much lower levels of productivity 
and do not benefit from the institutional strengths of an advanced economy such as the 
UK. But they are moving fast, and because of technology and increasingly international 
education, they are able to move up into high-value markets much more quickly than has 
been the case historically. Working to catch up, they invest heavily in ensuring the 
necessary resources (including a skilled workforce) are there in the right quantity and 
quality to support growth. As they continue to grow and develop, this strength in making 
the best use of available talent will allow them to make a sharp challenge to established 
advanced economies such as the UK. 
  
2 Brazil, Russia, India, Indonesia, China. 
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1.4   Industry sectors 
Following the recession, the government identified a key challenge for the UK as being 
“to achieve strong, sustainable and balanced growth that is more evenly shared across 
the country and between industries” (HM Treasury, 2011). The UK economy has a large 
concentration in business services, and especially in finance, alongside a substantial 
public sector, reflecting a large public role in education and health. 
During the ‘Great Moderation’ of the 1990s and 2000s, financial and business services 
generated much of the expansion in output, in turn leading to increased tax revenues 
which financed a sustained growth in public sector output and employment. That same 
pattern of growth also led to a substantial division in the sources of growth across nations 
and regions, with London having a high share of growth in the high value added sectors, 
especially in finance, while the growing public sector accounted for much of the 
expansion in other parts of the country. 
The sectoral composition of economic activity reflects a number of long term changes in 
economic conditions, and especially in terms of global competition and technological 
change. Like most advanced economies, the UK has seen a substantial fall in the role of 
manufacturing and a shift to services. That in large part reflects the emergence of 
increased competition, first of all in lower-value products but rising in sophistication over 
time, from developing economies. Falling trade barriers (generally, but also for the UK in 
the shape of the single European Market) have encouraged the trend, promoting trade 
but also increasing the trend to specialisation according to comparative advantages. 
While initially losing much of its low-value manufacturing base, the UK (like other 
advanced economies) has in time gained greatly in the shape of low cost imports and 
new markets for high value products and services. 
Technological change has also played a major role. In particular, those sectors leading 
growth over the past three decades, including specialist engineering, information 
technology and financial services, have been highly dependent on new technology. Their 
growth has been highly dependent on the supply of high level science, technology, 
engineering and mathematics skills (UKCES/Bosworth et al., 2013).  A relatively strong 
supply of graduates, especially in the sciences, has enabled the UK’s specialisation in 
these sectors. The UK has successfully attracted foreign direct investment (FDI), 
especially where the UK has ready access to European markets such as car production. 
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Table 1.2 Growing and contracting industry sectors, 2002-2012 
Output 
(% pa, 2002-2012) 
Employment  
(% pa, 2002-2012) 
Productivity 
(% pa,2002-2012) 
 
Fastest growing 
Other transport equipment (7%) Head offices (6%) Water transport (6%) 
Head offices (7%) Real estate (4%) Other transport equipment (6%) 
Water transport (5%) Legal & accounting (3%) Metal products (6%) 
IT services (6%) Residential & social care (3%) Manuf of motor vehicles (5%) 
Architectural & related services 
(5%) 
Other professional services (3%) Textiles etc (3%) 
Slowest growing 
Mining & quarrying (-8%) Textiles etc (-5%) Mining & quarrying (-5%) 
Warehousing & postal (-6%) Manuf of computers, etc (-5%) Warehousing & postal (-5%) 
Printing & recording (-3%) Printing & recording (-5%) Coke & petroleum (-3%) 
Coke & petroleum (-3%) Manuf of motor vehicles (-5%) Agriculture (-3%) 
Textiles etc (-3%) Pharmaceuticals (-4%) Water, sewerage & waste (-2%) 
Source: UKCES/Wilson et al. (2014)  
In the decade to 2012, sectors experiencing fastest growing output included both 
manufacturing and services industries but jobs growth was greater in professional and 
other business services, and some public services (see Table 1.2).  Some of the fastest 
growing sectors in terms of employment were also the largest: residential and social care, 
real estate and legal/accounting. Productivity growth was highest in some manufacturing 
industries which have increasingly concentrated on high-skill, high-value production, with 
declining employment but substantial increases in the value generated by each 
employee. 
The slowest growing sectors overall were mainly manufacturing and primary industries 
(such as agriculture, mineral extraction and processing activities) operating in highly 
competitive international markets. The development of productivity through the recession 
and recovery period tells an interesting story here, with strong productivity growth in 
manufacturing before the recession but growth in the production and services sector 
much weaker. Manufacturing and services have seen broadly stagnant productivity since 
the recession, but production industries have seen a significant fall (see Figure 1.8). 
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Figure 1.8 Output per hour worked, by sector, 2005-2013 
 
Source: ONS LPRODHIST Historical series of labour productivity (April 2014) 
Future projections of the UK labour market suggest these trends will continue over the 
decade ahead, with manufacturing continuing to decline in its share of output and 
employment (UKCES/Wilson et al., 2014). Growth will be driven by business services, 
ranging from ICT through to commercial and legal services, where the UK’s combination 
of skills and institutions give it unique advantages, and where demand is growing to 
support the fast-expanding production industries in the large emerging economies. 
The same projections of the shape of the labour market show that private services are 
expected to contribute 80 per cent of net job growth between 2012 and 2022, reflecting a 
continuation of the move towards services. The health and social care sector is expected 
to generate the greatest number of additional jobs within a single industry category. 
However, replacement demand (the need to fill jobs following retirement or death) will 
mean continued job openings and career opportunities across almost all industries, 
including those projected to see net decline (UKCES/Wilson et al., 2014). 
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The projections suggest continuation of another trend - a polarisation of the labour market 
tilted towards higher skilled jobs, with 2.3 million additional high level jobs (for managers, 
professionals, associate professionals); 800,000 fewer middle ranking administrative, 
skilled manual and routine blue collar jobs; and 600,000 additional jobs in lower skilled 
caring, leisure and other service roles. But again, replacement demand means that even 
in declining middle skill roles there will still be substantial new job opportunities. The shift 
to a higher skill workforce will continue through to 2022, when more than half of all jobs 
are projected to be held by people qualified at degree level. 
High skilled, high value work is increasingly found in emerging economies such as India 
and China. In several competitor countries industrial policy has nurtured growth in sectors 
such as ICT, pharmaceuticals and nano-technology, which have developed rapidly and 
become internationally competitive. Previously emerging, developing economies are 
increasingly providing direct competition to UK firms in higher value markets, and the 
place of the UK within these markets is less and less assured. 
1.5   Spatial variation in economic performance 
The UK economy has long been characterised by substantial disparities in output and 
employment between the different nations and regions. In particular, since the interwar 
period, southern England has benefited from the expansion of service industries while the 
rest of the UK has remained dependent on traditional, often declining industries. After it 
too had seen a decline over many decades, London’s economy has become the focus in 
recent decades, with a dramatic expansion in employment and output, driven in large part 
by the clustering of financial and business services in and around the City. 
Looking across the devolved nations and English regions (Figure 1.9) reinforces that 
perception, with London’s output per head far and away above the rest of the UK, even 
with a below-average employment rate. Among the rest of the UK, it is the southern 
regions of England which fare best in terms of output and employment. Aside from 
Scotland, which stands out for its ‘southern’ level output per head with the assistance of 
the North Sea oil and gas sector, there is a general picture of greater distance from 
London resulting in lower output and lower employment, especially in Wales, Northern 
Ireland and the English North East. Changes through the recession and recovery period 
have intensified some of the gaps, with growth in London and the South East setting the 
pace. Most of all, Northern Ireland saw a sharp reduction in output (four per cent nominal 
contraction 2007-2012) from an already low base. 
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Figure 1.9 Output per head and employment rate across nations and regions, 2012 
 
Source: ONS Regional Gross Value Added (Income Approach) NUTS1 Tables, Table 1.1; Annual Population 
Survey 
A review of the Local Enterprise Partnership (LEP) areas in England demonstrates that 
these disparities continue below regional level, but with some interesting complexities. 
Figure 1.10 compares per capita output with the employment rate in each LEP area in 
2012. London stands out from the crowd immediately, with output per head in excess of 
£37,000. Only one LEP area, the nearby Thames Valley Berkshire, even comes close to 
this level. 
Amongst the rest, a straightforward north-south story can be easily disproved by the high 
output per head of Cheshire and Warrington, and the lowest output per head (just 
£13,000, less than a third of the UK level) in Cornwall and the Isles of Scilly. While 
London and the Thames Valley clearly lead, and some of the poorest performers in terms 
of output and employment are in the north, intra-regional factors and urban-rural divides 
are also important. 
Changes in output and employment through the recession and recovery period also 
reveal geographic disparities (Figure 1.11). In 2012, southern Oxfordshire and northern 
Cheshire and Warrington had a similar level of output per head and a three percentage 
point difference in employment. But that conceals a wide difference in performance since 
2007 – Oxfordshire seeing a one per cent rise in the employment rate and nearly 12 per 
cent in (nominal) output growth, while Cheshire and Warrington saw a one per cent fall in 
employment and 5.4 per cent in output growth. 
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Figure 1.10 Output per head and employment across LEP areas, 2012 
 
Figure 1.11 Change in output and employment across LEP areas, 2007-2012 
 
Source: ONS LEP Gross Value Added release (April 2014) and Annual Population Survey employment rates 
  
Cheshire &  
Warrington 
Cornwall 
& IoS Liverpool CR 
London 
Oxfordshire 
Swindon  
& Wilts 
Tees Valley 
Thames Valley 
Berkshire 
60
65
70
75
80
85
 10,000  15,000  20,000  25,000  30,000  35,000  40,000
Em
pl
oy
m
en
t r
at
e,
 1
6-
64
, D
ec
 2
01
2 
GVA per head, £, 2012 
Swindon & Wilts  
Cornwall 
& IoS 
Tees Valley  
Thames Valley 
Berkshire  
Cheshire & 
Warrington  
 London    
Liverpool 
CR  
 Oxfordshire  
-8.0
-7.0
-6.0
-5.0
-4.0
-3.0
-2.0
-1.0
 -
 1.0
 2.0
-4.0 -2.0  -  2.0  4.0  6.0  8.0  10.0  12.0  14.0
C
ha
ng
e 
in
 e
m
pl
oy
m
en
t r
at
e,
 2
00
7-
20
12
 
Growth in GVA per head, 2007-2012 (nominal) 
17 
The Labour Market Story: The UK Following Recession 
 
Low output, low employment LEP areas in the north such as Tees Valley and Liverpool 
saw output growth between 2007 and 2012; nine per cent in Liverpool’s case, the third 
fastest of all LEP areas. Meanwhile in the south, high output Thames Valley Berkshire 
saw relatively modest output growth, and Swindon and Wiltshire (above-average for 
output and employment) saw one of the sharpest falls in the employment rate (six per 
cent) and in nominal output (1.7 per cent). 
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2 The labour market 
The clearest insight into the strengths of the UK labour market has come from the very 
different experience of the 2008 recession compared to previous episodes. In 1980 and 
1990-1991, contractions in output were shallower than in 2008 and recovered much 
sooner. But in each of those recessions, employment effects magnified the falls in output, 
with employment falling and not recovering until many years later. 
2.1   Unemployment and job creation 
The 2008 recession was much sharper in terms of the contraction in output (Figure 2.1), 
twice as deep as the 1980 recession, and still some way from recovery five years after 
the pre-recession peak. But the fall in employment was much less, and had been 
recovered within five years; although an increase in the size of the workforce means that 
unemployment has not returned to previous levels, it is far from the levels seen in the 
1980s long after the recession had ended and the UK economy was experiencing robust 
growth. 
In a recent review of unemployment in the ‘Great Recession’ across countries, Pissarides 
(2013) explores the UK and US experience through a Beveridge curve analysis, mapping 
the unemployment and vacancy rates against each other. In particular, he notes the 
much smaller initial shift outwards in the curve (resulting in a higher vacancy rate relative 
to the unemployment rate) during the recession in the UK, but the much faster rebound in 
the US where the vacancy rate quickly recovered (see also Smith, 2012). He concludes 
that the UK suffered a slower return to job creation because of macroeconomic rigidity 
(the same rigidities clear in the slow response of output following the recession), but at 
the microeconomic level unemployment did not increase as much as in the US, for a 
similar contraction in the vacancy rate: 
The UK case can easily be explained. The reforms to the institutional 
structure of the labour market in the 1980s, and their consolidation in the 
1990s and 2000s, clearly had an effect. The reforms shifted the labour market 
policy incentives to employment through tax reductions and tougher 
unemployment (and non-participation) support, and increased the institutional 
flexibility of the labour market. Important reforms took place in the role of 
trade unions and employment protection legislation. (2013, 395) 
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Figure 2.1 Output and employment in three UK recessions 
 
 
Source: ONS GDP at constant prices, SA (ABMI) and Total actual weekly hours worked (millions) (YBUS) 
  
85
90
95
100
105
110
115
-8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
O
ut
pu
t (
Pr
e-
re
ce
ss
io
n 
pe
ak
 =
 1
00
) 
Quarters from pre-recession peak 
1979Q4 1990Q2 2008Q1
85
90
95
100
105
110
115
-8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
H
ou
rs
 w
or
ke
d 
(P
re
-r
ec
es
si
on
 p
ea
k 
= 
10
0)
 
Quarters from pre-recession peak 
1979Q4 1990Q2 2008Q1
20 
The Labour Market Story: The UK Following Recession 
 
Figure 2.2 UK Beveridge Curve 2001-2014 
 
Source: ONS LFS unemployment rate (MGSX) and vacancy rate (= AP2Y / (AP2Y+MGRZ)) 
An updated Beveridge curve is presented at Figure 2.2. It shows the decisive shift as 
recession took hold: from September 2008 to May 2009, the vacancy rate fell by more 
than a quarter, and unemployment increased by two percentage points. For the following 
three years, the UK labour market remained around this new steady state, with labour 
demand increasing enough to absorb the growing workforce, but with fewer vacancies 
and higher unemployment. 
In keeping with the wider picture on recovery, from the middle of 2013 there finally seems 
to be signs of an inward shift, with increasing vacancies driving falling unemployment. 
Vacancies remain below pre-recession levels, in contrast to their rapid recovery in the 
US, while unemployment is responding more slowly in recovery than in decline; the latest 
vacancy rate matches a 6.9 per cent unemployment rate, but the same level of vacancies 
saw unemployment between six and 6.2 per cent in the autumn of 2008. That may simply 
be because vacancies are changing faster than unemployment, or it may be that there 
has been a permanent outward shift in the operation of the Beveridge curve, so that the 
vacancy rate is higher for any given unemployment rate than has been the historical 
experience; only time will tell. 
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Certainly in a European context, the UK seems to have fared much better than many 
other member states, despite suffering a sharper contraction in output than many of 
them. The UK unemployment rate peaked at 8.4 per cent at the end of 2011 and has 
since fallen back down below seven per cent. By contrast, the EU average remained at 
10.7 per cent at the end of 2013, higher than the UK peak unemployment rate. However, 
the EU average obscures some very large differences. Because of debt crises in several 
Eurozone member states, there are extreme cases of macroeconomic rigidity driving 
increases in unemployment, with Greece and Spain both seeing 2007 unemployment 
rates of 8.3 per cent, rising to 27.3 per cent and 26.4 per cent by 2013 (Eurostat).  
In accounting for the improved efficiency of the labour market in adapting to a sharp 
recession, there are arguments that add to the straightforward explanation of greater 
flexibility. For example, Brinkley (2009) argues that firms’ increasing reliance on and 
investment in human capital makes skilled workers prized assets which employers are 
resistant to losing even as trading conditions decline. 
The greater stability of business investment in training (UKCES/Felstead et al., 2013) 
compared to fixed capital provides one indication that this may be going on. So also does 
the composition of changes in employment through the recession and recovery, which 
have favoured higher skilled roles. Magnifying long term trends towards a more 
‘polarised’ labour market, and one favouring higher skilled, managerial and professional 
roles, jobs characterised by more routine tasks (whether cognitive or manual) suffered a 
sharp fall in recession (see Figure 2.3), with little recovered even as employment as a 
whole has reached new highs. 
Meanwhile managerial and professional roles, but also those service roles characterised 
by a need for personal contact, saw little decline through the recession, with growth just 
stalling for a while. Figure 2.3 summarises the changes across four headline categories. 
The experience presented here suggests that, in keeping with evidence from the US 
(Jaimovich and Siu, 2012), longer term shifts in workforce composition may be 
concentrated in episodes such as the 2008-2009 recession. 
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2.2   Employment: a range of experiences 
For such a sharp and serious recession, the UK has seen only a moderate increase in 
unemployment. But as the occupational composition of the fall in employment shows, the 
effects have not been uniform, and some parts of the workforce have fared better and 
worse than others in the years since 2008; and before then, too. Tough times in the 
labour market hit those at the margins especially harshly, and the recession and recovery 
period has been no different here. 
Figure 2.3 Growth in employment by sets of occupational groups, 2005-2013 
 
Source: ONS Annual Population Survey via NOMIS, employment by SOC 2010 Major Group. ‘Managers and 
professionals’ = Major Groups 1-3; ‘Admin and skilled trades’ = Major Groups 4 and 5; ‘Care, leisure and 
sales’ = Major Groups 6 and 7; ‘Elementary and process’ = Major Groups 8 and 9. 
Chief among those affected by tough labour market conditions have been young people, 
with much media attention as youth unemployment went above the one million mark. It is 
certainly true that youth unemployment has been particularly high during recession. And 
the decline in jobs in elementary occupations has hit the young particularly harshly, as 
they account for a substantial proportion of jobs taken by young people; understandably 
given the need for education and experience, numbers of young people in high-skill 
occupations are limited. 
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But it is also true that there is a longer term shift at work here, with the employment 
participation of young people diverging markedly from the rest of the workforce from 
around 2004. The greater change in the recession in part reflected that earlier 
divergence, where youth unemployment had already increased relative to the rest of the 
labour market. Figure 2.4 helps to see some of the changes through the years of 
recession and recovery, with large falls in 16-24 employment and a large rise in the 
unemployment rate. 
Perhaps the most interesting comparison is with the 50+ age group, which has seen an 
increase in the employment rate through the period; the difference is all the greater 
considering the decline in the size of the young people’s workforce and a substantial 
growth in the workforce of those over 50. The consequence of changing employment 
rates amidst changing workforce size is that, between 2007 and 2013 1.2 million more 
over-50s found work while 400,000 fewer young people were employed. 
One of the complexities in understanding the youth unemployment problem is that, in 
international comparison, institutional differences in the level of education participation 
can lead to different unemployment rates. Because unemployment rates are measured 
against those working and looking to work, variations in the proportion of those in 
education and not looking for work can obscure the picture. For that reason, 
unemployment proportions (comparing against the total age group population) are often a 
more reliable guide and here, the UK is a poor performer, substantially above the EU 
average (12.4 per cent in the UK, 9.7 per cent EU average in 2012). 
An interesting feature of the evidence on young people and the labour market is the 
changing overlap between work and education. Paradoxically, given the increasing profile 
of apprenticeships, there has been a sustained decline in the number of British young 
people combining study and employment. Where the UK used to have a relatively high 
proportion of those combining study and employment, it has declined through the 2000s 
and is now middling. Figure 2.5 suggests that among north European economies (which 
often share the UK’s low overall unemployment), the continuing high levels of combined 
work and study play a part in maintaining low overall youth unemployment. 
Both because of the new arrivals into unemployment, and the greater difficulty in finding 
work, a recession in the labour market is often associated with increased long term 
unemployment. This is a particular concern where recovery in the overall economy has 
taken so long. Figure 2.6 highlights the breakdown between durations of unemployment, 
with an increase in short term unemployment feeding through into the longer duration 
categories. 
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On the other hand, while long term unemployment has increased (the latest data suggest 
a 12-month rate of 2.5 per cent, double the rate before the recession), the median 
unemployment duration has remained well below the levels seen in the 1990s.3 It took 
until 1997, more than five years after the end of recession, for the median duration of 
unemployment to fall below 30 weeks. In recent years, the median peaked at 26 weeks. 
On international comparisons, the UK fares well in terms of long-term unemployment; 
around the OECD average but lower than the EU-15 average of four per cent. 
 
Figure 2.4 Change in employment and unemployment, by age group, 2007-2013 
 
Source: ONS Annual Population Survey, employment and unemployment by age (Jul-Jun data for 2007 and 
2013)  
3 Using DWP Claimant Count data, via NOMIS. 
-8.2 
6.6 
-6.0 
-0.8 
2.3 
3.4 
1.0 1.6 
13.3 
-10.0
-5.0
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
Employment Rate (p.p.) Unemployment Rate (p.p.) Workforce (% change)
C
ha
ng
e 
20
07
 to
 2
01
3 
16-24 25-49 50+
25 
                                                 
The Labour Market Story: The UK Following Recession 
 
 
Figure 2.5 Youth unemployment and earning while learning, EU member states, 2012 
 
Source: ONS Young People in the Labour Market, 2014, using ELFS data 
 
Figure 2.6 Unemployment by duration, 16-64 
 
Source: ONS Labour Market Statistics, UNEM01 table. 
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2.3   Changing employment practices 
One particular dimension of the labour market recovery has been the substantial role 
played by self-employment. While most advanced economies, including the US, have 
seen significant falls in self-employment, the UK has seen a sustained growth, accounting 
for 83 per cent of the net gains in employment since 2007 (Ashworth et al., 2014). That 
development builds on an already high rate of self-employment, and has taken place 
across regions. The move to self-employment seems to be concentrated among two 
groups. Among the UK-born, it is overwhelmingly concentrated among the over-50s; 
among the non-UK-born, almost half belong to the 30-39 years age bracket (Ashworth et 
al., 2014, p7). 
The significance of this development for the long term health of the economy is not yet 
fully clear. The increase seems to have taken place alongside a fall in the relative 
earnings from self-employment, with a substantial real terms reduction in income. On the 
other hand, recent survey research for the Resolution Foundation4 shows that 72 per cent 
of self-employed people preferred their current situation, while among the newly self-
employed, 28 per cent expressed a preference to be an employee. As the recovery 
develops, it will be interesting to see how the choices made by the recently self-employed 
continue to evolve: whether their incomes rise, they seek to return to employment, or they 
settle with limited income from self-employment (perhaps to supplement a pension). 
Another change in employment practice comes from the rise of ‘precarious’ forms of 
employment, including casual, very short-term arrangements or those with ‘zero hours’ 
guaranteed. In terms of temporary contract arrangements, the long term trend before the 
onset of recession was for a slow decline in these arrangements (even as employment 
increased). Recession has led to a moderate reversal of this trend, with a sustained 
increase in the use of fixed period contracts and casual employment (Figure  2.7). 
Again, it will be interesting to see the extent to which this change is a symptom of 
recession and recovery, and whether a return to sustained growth will see a decline once 
again. Temporary employment has advantages in offering flexibility, but there are 
concerns over its increased use. In particular, zero-hours contracts require that 
employees only attend work and are paid when there is work to be done.  
4 http://www.resolutionfoundation.org/press/self-employed-survey/ 
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In early 2014, the ONS (2014a) conducted a new business survey specifically to tackle 
these problems and estimate that there are 1.4m employee contracts “that do not 
guarantee a minimum number of hours”.5 Overall, 13 per cent of businesses report using 
them, with higher proportions for large businesses and those in accommodation and food 
services (45 per cent) and health and social work. While more likely to work part time, 
zero hours contracts employees are much more likely (35 per cent to 12 per cent) to want 
more hours’ work than they currently get. 
Figure 2.7 Temporary employees, 1997 to 2013 quarterly, 000s employees 
 
Source: ONS Labour Market Statistics, table EMP07 
2.4   Migration and the labour market 
During the 2000s, immigration saw a substantial and sustained increase, accounted for 
by migrants from the Accession 8 (A8) EU member states6 and more recently Bulgaria 
and Romania, as well as a general increase in migration from outside the EU. From 2001 
to 2012, the latest estimate is that there was net inward migration of 2,359,000. Because 
of emigration by UK nationals, the effect on the composition of the workforce can be 
understated: in a typical year in the 2000s, around half a million people migrated to the 
UK. 
5 One person may hold several contracts, and whether an employee is always conscious of not having an hours guarantee 
may vary greatly with their situation. Individual level perceptions imply that 583,000 people are on zero hours contracts. 
6 Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia. 
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From 2004 to 2012, the UK added to its resident population an estimated 949,000 A8 
citizens, 141,000 citizens from the previous EU member states, and 647,000 non-EU 
citizens.7 During the same period, the labour market performance of migrants improved. 
Where previously, migrants typically had higher unemployment, migrant men became 
more likely to be in work than native men (Frontier Economics, 2013, p87). These 
changes have had substantial implications for the composition of the workforce, with 
much subsequent discussion on their implications. 
Recent migrants have been more likely to be employed in low-skilled work; over a 
decade, migrant shares in low skilled sectors increased by six percentage points, rather 
than three percentage points in other sectors, with similar results for occupations. Sectors 
with high levels of temporary working seem more likely to employ migrants, and agency 
working is also an important route for migrant employment, especially among A8 workers. 
Paradoxically, while more likely to be employed in less skilled work, recent migrants are 
on average better educated than native workers (Frontier Economics, 2013, pp87-89). 
While there is some evidence of employers viewing young native workers as having 
‘attitude problems’, there is little evidence of a general desire to hire migrant workers in 
preference to native workers (Green et al., 2013). There is on the other hand evidence 
that the arrival of migrants into lower skilled work has encouraged low-skilled native 
workers to move into more communication-intensive roles, while migrants, often less 
skilled in the English language, focus on manual task-intensive roles (Bisello, 2014). 
2.5  Labour markets across nations and regions 
Figure 2.8 highlights the different experiences of devolved nations and English regions 
through the period 2007 to 2013, by exploring the employment rate before and after for 
each area. The 45 degree line represents stability across the six-year period. Those 
below the line have seen a fall in employment, which is the case for everywhere except 
London. The South East, with the highest employment in 2007 remains the second 
highest despite a two percentage point fall.  
7 Data from ONS International Compendium: Population Theme, 24 April 2014. 
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Figure 2.8 Change in employment rates, 16-64, devolved nations and English regions, 
2007-2013 
 
Source: ONS Annual Population Survey, employment (Jul-Jun data for 2007 and 2013) 
 
Figure 2.9 Workforce with no qualifications and change in unemployment, 2007-2013 
 
Source: ONS Annual Population Survey, employment (Jul-Jun 2007 and 2013) and qualifications (Oct-Dec 
2007) 
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Interestingly, the largest falls in the employment rate are in two areas with higher-than-
average employment levels in 2007: Scotland and the East Midlands, with both seeing a 
fall of around three percentage points. Those nations and regions with the lowest 
prevailing rates (again, excepting London) such as Northern Ireland, Wales, and the 
North East, also all saw falls by 2013. Excepting London (and, narrowly, the East of 
England), all nations and regions shared in lower employment rates by 2013. However, 
those areas already suffering employment problems have not been spared further 
increases in unemployment either. At the local level too, areas with relatively high levels 
of unemployment at the start of the decade also had them in 2010 (Ormerod, 2014). 
Spatial employment differences are especially pronounced for those people with no or 
low qualifications. London and the surrounding regions of the ‘Greater South East’ have 
disproportionately high shares of jobs requiring higher level qualifications in the UK, while 
areas such as the North East and the North West have the lowest rates. Given that we 
know those with no qualifications face poorer prospects for employment and earnings 
(see below), it is unsurprising that regions and nations with more people with no 
qualifications saw greater rises in unemployment (Figure 2.9). 
2.6   Matching skills to needs 
While the UK labour market has performed very well in efficiency terms through the tough 
times of recession and a slow recovery, there are larger question marks about its 
effectiveness in matching labour supply to employer needs. At the macro level, there are 
certainly questions about the level of underemployment in the workforce, with substantial 
numbers reporting a wish for greater or fewer hours of work than they currently have. 
Such arguments are summarised in the Bell-Blanchflower underemployment index,8 
which adds to the conventional unemployment rate an estimate of net additional hours’ 
work which is desired but not fulfilled. That index suggests substantial additional potential 
in the labour market, if employees can be matched to the right job opportunities. A similar 
approach is taken in Weale (2014), but with further adjustments made to account for 
revealed preference in changes to hours worked, and for the distribution of hours 
according to productivity, which again suggests some slack in the labour market, but only 
a little under one per cent of GDP. 
8 http://bellblanchflowerunderemployment.com/ 
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Perhaps more interesting is how well the labour market is adapting to the substantial and 
continuing supply-side changes to the UK economy. Figure 2.10 sets out the way industry 
sector labour markets have adapted over the past few years, plotting each sector in terms 
of its unemployed past workers and its available industries. The trendlines help to identify 
the relative tightness of different sectors. Those above the line are those with a higher 
ratio of vacancies to unemployment, and those below have relatively fewer vacancies. 
A snapshot is taken at three points: the pre-recession low for unemployment; the post-
recession peak; and the most recently available data. There is some stability in relative 
positions around the economy-wide trend, with the same major sectors above the line 
(financial, professional services, education, health and social work) and below the line 
(construction and manufacturing). Interestingly, it is those sectors initially below the line 
which see the most substantial changes amidst recession. This is particularly significant 
given ambitions to grow the share of export-led manufacturing in the economy. 
Also worth noting is that the broad picture across sectors is clearly returning to a similar 
pattern to that seen before the recession, with a tightening even in those sectors which 
were most clearly affected, and an upward shift in the slope of the trendline. That 
reversion corresponds to the path of the overall ratio of unemployment to the number of 
vacancies (2.4 in late 2007, 5.5 in early 2010 and moving back down to 4.1 at the end of 
2013). 
That said, given the troubled recent record on productivity growth and the particular weak 
points in the British economy, it is worth considering whether labour market mismatch is 
leaving some of the workforce underused while some firms can’t grow because they can’t 
find the right skills. Certainly, the 2013 UK Commission’s Employer Skills Survey 
(UKCESS) provides evidence on both counts. In that year, a tightening labour market 
saw 22 per cent of vacancies characterised by skills shortages, up from 16 per cent two 
years before. In Scotland, skills shortages accounted for 25 per cent of vacancies up from 
15 per cent. (UKCES/Winterbotham et al., 2014, p27) 
Altogether, the estimate was of 146,000 skills shortage vacancies in the UK labour 
market in 2013; a small number in a workforce of 30 million. But there is clear evidence 
that skills shortage vacancies are likely to occur precisely where firms need those skills, 
and that employers end up facing higher wage costs or seeking to ‘make do’ with less 
skilled employees, both hindering productivity growth (Haskel and Martin, 1993). 
Alongside skills shortages during recruitment, 15 per cent of establishments report skills 
gap with their existing workforce, accounting for an estimated 1.4m employees in 2013 
(UKCES/Winterbotham et al., 2014, p39).  
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At the same time, we find nearly half (48 per cent) of establishments reporting employees 
with both qualifications and skills more advanced than is required for their current job 
role, accounting for some 16 per cent of the total workforce, an estimated 4.3 million 
workers; more than are considered to have skills gaps (UKCES/Winterbotham et al., 
2014, pp49-50). The coincidence of skills shortages and skills gaps in some firms with 
underemployment of skills in other firms seems a paradox, but there are some likely 
explanations: for one, that the composition of workforce skills is not the same as that 
needed by employers. For a second explanation, it may be that even where the skills are 
available in the workforce, the labour market is not as effective as we would like at 
matching those skills to employers’ needs. (See ‘The Labour Market Story: The State of 
UK Skills’ for further discussion of skills shortage vacancies, gaps and under-use of 
skills). 
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Figure 2.10 Vacancies and unemployed by industry, before, during, after recession 
 
Source: ONS Labour Market Statistics, UNEM03 and VACS02 tables. Trendlines are fitted with a zero 
intercept; higher slopes indicate tighter labour markets, with more vacancies per unemployed person. ‘FIRE’ 
= financial services, insurance and real estate activities; ‘Prof & tech’ = professional, scientific and technical 
activities. 
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Patterson et al. (2013) explore the question of mismatch between workers and jobs in the 
UK, by estimating a matching function with Labour Force Survey data. They find 
‘imbalances between vacancies and unemployed workers may be much more important 
for skilled (high wage) workers’, and that such imbalances have increased with 
persistence as a result of recession, perhaps reflecting the continued tightness in growth 
sector labour markets seen in Figure 2.10. The same analysis does not find mismatch to 
have worsened across geographic areas. 
Comparing the UK with the US, there appears to be a lower level of mismatch in the UK 
but the recession saw a much steeper rise, perhaps because of its particular exposure to 
change in the financial sector and the Eurozone export markets. Also, interestingly, 
where the US seems to have seen the level of mismatch fall consistently since the end of 
the recession, in the UK it saw a sharp fall and then a growth through 2011 and 2012 
(Patterson et al., 2013, p14). This could reflect underlying structural issues such as 
demand deficiency. 
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3 Skills, pay, and mobility 
Labour markets matter not only in the aggregate sense of matching available labour to 
employers’ demands, but also in creating opportunities for individuals to earn and to 
develop their careers. As a society, we want the labour market to not only be efficient at 
keeping people in work and effective at matching skills requirements, but also to afford 
people the opportunity to do fulfilling work, earn decent wages, and progress according to 
their skills and merit. 
3.1    The link between skills and employment and earnings outcomes 
Skills matter a great deal for individuals’ labour market outcomes. They maximise the 
prospects of being in work: 
So, do less educated workers bear the brunt of unemployment? [The data] 
suggest that they do … Workers who left school prior to age 18 not only face 
significantly higher rates of entry into unemployment, they also experience 
substantially longer jobless spells relative to their more educated 
counterparts. Thus, higher rates of unemployment among the low-skilled 
appear to be a consequence of both increased incidence and increased 
duration of unemployment spells. (Elsby et al., 2011, 361) 
The same applies to earnings potential. Using the OECD PIAAC survey to look at skills 
rather than qualification, Hanushek et al. (2013) find the UK to have a high lifetime 
returns to skill in comparison with the majority of advanced economies: 23 per cent 
additional earnings for a one standard deviation improvement in numeracy skills, 
compared to 18 per cent across 22 countries. 
Recent research by the Social Market Foundation highlights the fifth of the UK workforce 
employed on low rates of pay (defined as earning less than two-thirds of the median 
hourly wage).  While a high proportion among advanced economies, more concerning is 
that the majority do not move out of the low paid category after a year. One in eight 
workers are in low pay and will still be so a year later; of those currently in work paid 
above the two-thirds median hourly wage, only five per cent will be low paid a year later 
(Keohane and Hupkau, 2014). 
More than half of those on low pay are educated to GCSE level or below; 51 per cent of 
those with no qualifications are on low pay (Keohane and Hupkau, 2014, p27). Not that 
all is lost due to prior educational attainment: those least likely to move occupational 
group were those on low pay who did not receive training in the past year (Keohane and 
Hupkau, 2014, p28). 
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Skills play a critical role in shaping employment and earning. That includes the addition of 
new skills, and it is not only limited to graduate skills. Recent analysis for BIS estimates 
that a Level 2 Apprenticeship adds a net present value between £48,000 and £74,000 to 
lifetime earnings, and a Level 3 Apprenticeship between £77,000 and £117,000. 
Likewise, holding a Level 3 NVQ makes men nine percentage points more likely to be 
employed compared to holding Level 2 or lower qualifications; for women, the difference 
is 17 percentage points (Conlon et al., 2011). 
3.2   Earnings and living standards 
One of the biggest changes in the UK labour market since the onset of recession is the 
sustained decline in real wages. Starting in 2008, wages have not grown as fast as 
consumer prices, and so real wages have declined (Figure 3.1). Such has been the 
strength of the decline that real wages at the end of 2013 were around the levels first 
achieved a decade earlier. 
There is an argument that this change started earlier: across much of the wage 
distribution, wages stagnated as early as 2003. Given the growing economy for the years 
from 2003 to 2008, these trends have led to concerns that wages have ‘decoupled’ from 
productivity, with calls to set policy to increase the share of GDP paid out in wages 
(Lansley and Reed, 2013). 
In a recent review of the path of real wages, the ONS (Taylor et al., 2014) concluded that 
the decline since the onset of recession seems to be ‘the response to the fall in 
productivity in 2008 and 2009 and its subsequent weakness’. While they see a role for 
both rising hours worked and sectoral composition cutting into pay during the recession, 
both of these were factors during the downturn and have since been offset to some 
extent. 
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Figure 3.1 Growth in average real wages, 2001-2013 
 
Source: Taylor et al. 2014. Real wages are from Average Weekly Earnings, deflated by CPI. 
Taylor et al. (2014) suggest that the divergence between output and consumer prices 
also played a part. Specifically, while consumers faced higher import prices cutting the 
value of their wages, the cost of wages to employers remained much more stable in 
terms of the goods and services they sell (Figure 3.2). Adjusting for this difference in 
consumer and output pricing, wages track productivity much more closely. 
Taking a longer term view of whether wages ‘decoupled’ from productivity, Pessoa and 
Van Reenen (2012) find likewise that much of the explanation lies in the divergence of 
wages from their cost to employers. That includes the different paths of consumer and 
output prices, but also the increased ‘wedge’ of labour costs over and above wages (most 
notably, pension costs). They find that, along with an increase in wage inequality, these 
changes can explain most of the apparent difference, and that ‘there is almost no net 
decoupling [of wages and productivity] in the UK’.  
In terms of the response to the conditions of recession and poor productivity, Gregg and 
Machin (2012) find that real wages have proven much more sensitive to unemployment in 
the recent recession than in previous episodes. In keeping with the path of the labour 
market in 2013, they suggest that unemployment’s fall will be faster than the recovery in 
earnings. The increase in sensitivity has been across the wage distribution, although 
workers in the bottom half of the wage distribution face a much greater sensitivity of 
wages to unemployment. Equally, the low-paid labour market has not benefited from an 
overall positive effect on the wage distribution arising from immigration (Dustman et al., 
2013). 
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Figure 3.2 Consumption and Product Wages in the UK, 2000-2013 
 
Source: Taylor et al. (2014), Consumption Wage uses CPI, Product Wage uses GDP deflator 
3.3   Occupational change and job prospects 
In the past decade the UK labour market has generated its largest number of jobs in high 
skill categories, which include managerial, professional and technical roles. The recent 
publication of the fifth iteration of the Working Futures projections suggest that this trend 
is set to continue in the years ahead, with over four million net new jobs added in these 
occupational groups (UKCES/Wilson et al., 2014). Besides these high-skill roles, only 
jobs in the caring, leisure and other services group are also set to see a net expansion 
(Figure 3.3), suggesting that those with greater skills will be in continuing demand for 
some years to come. 
The leading cause for these changes is the falling cost of computational power, which 
allows routine tasks to be reliably automated, making possible a substitution of capital for 
labour where jobs are routine task-intensive. Combined with a general skills bias in 
technological change, demonstrated in high skills premia (Hanushek et al., 2013), the 
change results in growing prospects for the highly skilled, with potentially falling prospects 
for the middle skilled. 
The concern is that the sustained decline in middle-ranked occupations (administrative 
and secretarial, and the skilled trades) will limit opportunities for middle skill individuals to 
find fulfilling careers and earn decent incomes. There will be ‘lovely’ jobs for the high-
skilled and ‘lousy’ jobs for the low-skilled (Goos and Manning, 2007). This is the much-
discussed ‘hollowing out’ thesis: that the labour market is polarising into high- and low-
skilled jobs, with a diminishing middle. 
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There is some controversy here, as some data suggests that these changes are less 
consistent than the theory proposes (Holmes and Mayhew, 2012). Further, analysis of the 
wage distribution suggests that opportunities in the middle are not disappearing, as “a 
number of relatively ‘good’ jobs begin to look a lot more like mid-wage jobs” (Holmes and 
Mayhew, 2012, p10). 
It may be that qualitative polarisation, in terms of job types, is not reflected quantitatively, 
in terms of wages. It is also worth bearing in mind that the need to replace departing 
workers means that there remain plenty of new job openings all occupational levels, even 
in those occupations which are declining in terms of their overall number (UKCES/Wilson 
et al., 2014; McIntosh, 2013). On the other hand, qualitative change in terms of job type 
may be a problem if aspirations and education, training and employment institutions fail to 
fully adapt. The fates of those displaced from middle-skill occupations and the changes to 
career progression arising from polarisation remains a gap in the literature (McIntosh, 
2013, p44). 
Figure 3.3 Past and future net change in SOC2010 Major Groups 
 
Source: UKCES/Wilson et al. (2014) 
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3.4   Inequalities in the labour market 
There are significant differences in labour outcomes between various groups in the UK, 
including in income and earnings, economic activity, and employment and unemployment 
rates. For example, some groups in the population struggle to enter employment and 
maintain their position in the labour market.  Women, people from minority ethnic groups, 
people with disabilities, and those aged under 25 and over 55 years are all more likely to 
be either unemployed or economically inactive (Brewer et al., 2012). 
The differences in the labour market position of men compared to women (including the 
distribution of workers by occupation and industry) have significant effects on the 
observed gender pay gap.  Men typically work more hours than women and are more 
likely to work in higher-level occupations, which typically attract higher pay. The gender 
pay gap (the difference between men’s and women’s median hourly pay excluding 
overtime for full-time employees) was 9.6 per cent in April 2012 compared to 10.5 per 
cent in 2011 (data from Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings, 2012). 
There is also variation across ethnic groups in the labour market.  Employment, 
unemployment and inactivity for White and Indian individuals are close to the overall 
average. People from Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic groups tend to perform most 
poorly on measures of economic activity, with relatively high unemployment, low 
employment and high inactivity rates. However, within ethnic groups there are additional 
differences by gender, age and educational attainment, such that there is a complex 
relationship between groups’ characteristics and their performance in the labour market. 
There are also marked differences according to disability status with the unemployment 
rate for individuals with a long term health problem or disability being much higher than 
for people without a long term health problem or disability. Economic activity and 
employment rates are also considerably lower for people with disabilities compared to 
people without disabilities. The unemployment rate is nearly twice as high amongst 
people with a disability and the inactivity rate for people with a long-term health problem 
or disability is more than three times the rate for people without a disability. People with a 
disability have a number of labour market disadvantages – they are more likely to be part-
time employees or self-employed than full-time employees compared with people without 
disabilities. People with a disability in employment are more likely to have no or low level 
qualifications and are, on average, older than workers without a disability (although this 
varies by type of disability). 
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4 Skills and policy: challenges and possibilities 
In the long run, a return to sustained economic growth sufficient to make up lost progress 
in closing the productivity gap with leading advanced economies will require the UK to 
tackle limits on innovation, competition, infrastructure and investment. For an increasingly 
knowledge-driven service economy such as the UK, it is investment in ‘intangibles’ such 
as research and development, software, reputation, organisational improvement and 
training which increasingly matters the most: together, intangible investment was £37bn 
greater than traditional physical investment in 2008. Such investments are also highly 
complementary, with new technologies requiring new processes and new skills (Dal 
Borgo et al., 2013). 
4.1   Skills and economic growth 
For an advanced economy such as the UK, investment in improved skills makes a critical 
contribution to ensure that the right human capital is in place to take advantage of new 
market opportunities and new technologies. Recent research suggests that a one per 
cent increase in the graduate workforce results in an increase of 0.2 to 0.5 per cent in 
productivity (Holland et al., 2013). 
Decomposition of the gap in productivity between the UK and leading advanced 
economies finds labour quality (primarily determined by skill levels) to account for around 
a fifth of the gap in the early 2000s (O’Mahony and de Boer, 2002). An analysis of the 
effects of skills shortages on firm performance in the 1980s suggests that if they had 
been reduced to European average levels, the UK would have seen 0.4 per cent faster 
productivity growth through the decade (Haskel and Martin, 1993). 
At firm level, evidence shows that provision of skills training is associated with firm 
survival (Collier et al., 2007). Improving productivity performance depends on possessing 
appropriate skills to develop ambitious product market strategies and then implementing 
them, which depends in turn on management capability (UKCES/Mason and Constable, 
2012). Various training programmes, such as Apprenticeships, are associated with 
achieving a relatively good fit between the skills of employees and the needs of the 
workplace which contributes to overall organisational performance and growth (see for 
example Hogarth et al., 2012). 
UKCESS shows that firms which develop their workforce are less likely to experience skill 
shortages or skill gaps, and are consequently less likely to lose business to competitors, 
experience delays in developing new products and services, or encounter problems 
achieving quality and customer expectations (UKCES/Winterbotham et al., 2014). 
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4.2  The state of the labour market 
In this paper, we have presented an overview of the state of the labour market within the 
UK economy in early 2014, as it moves into sustained recovery after some tough years. 
The recession which started that period saw a sharper contraction than faced by most 
other advanced economies as an immediate result of the financial crisis. It is unsurprising 
that such a large shock uncovered a series of weaknesses with the UK economy, and in 
particular the labour market. 
In fact, the greater surprise is that at the headline level the labour market performed as 
efficiently as it did; given the fall in output, experience of past recessions would have 
suggested a far greater and more sustained rise in unemployment. That said, there was 
still a substantial rise in the numbers unemployed, and this increase hit hardest on many 
at the fringes of the labour market, least able to withstand the shock, including especially 
young people and the long-term unemployed. 
Alongside the unemployed are those for whom labour market outcomes have meant 
employment, but not necessarily the type of employment they are seeking. There is 
certainly evidence of many people quantitatively underemployed (wanting more hours 
than they have) and only able to find temporary work. The large rise in self-employment 
may also be a last resort for some of those involved; better than unemployment, but not 
as they would prefer. These are all fair criticisms of the limits of the labour market’s 
efficiency; although, on the other hand, they are all likely superior outcomes than 
consigning those involved to lasting unemployment. 
The larger issues are longer lasting ones, in many ways already existing and crystallised 
by the recession. Youth employment, for example, may have fallen sharply in the 
recession, but it had been falling for some years previously, amidst a tight labour market. 
Then there is the wider problem that while our labour market seems efficient, it may not 
always be so effective. Alongside that quantitative underemployment (hours), we seem to 
have plenty of qualitative underemployment, where people are unable to find work that 
properly utilises their skills. Worse still, we seem also to have many firms facing limits on 
growth because they can’t find the skills they need. 
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To some extent, these problems will always be with us; but given the UK’s particularly 
poor record on labour productivity performance since the onset of recession, tackling the 
rate of mismatches must become a top priority. While they remain they present yet more 
limits to the potential for longer term growth, for the wider economy but also for 
individuals, limiting their prospects to work and earn. For firms too, they represent lost 
opportunities to win new sales, improve efficiency or innovate new products and services. 
Whether through improving the skills of workers, improving firms’ ability to match workers 
to job needs, or wider changes, investments in improving labour market effectiveness 
surely will have great value in the years ahead. 
4.3   Policy challenges 
In a time of great change in technology and global trading conditions, the UK labour 
market needs to continue to evolve and adapt if it is to match the skills of the workforce to 
the needs of firms as well as provide opportunities for people to earn a living and build a 
career. In particular, it must adapt to a number of major challenges: 
• Sustaining the fall in unemployment, and working to ensure that those left long-
term unemployed, especially those young when recession hit, can return to 
employment. 
• Evolving education and training institutions to ensure that they support successful 
transitions from education and into employment. 
• Ensuring that the supply of skills, and its matching, minimises unmet skills needs 
among firms, which in turn contribute to lower productivity growth. 
• Adapting labour market institutions (education, employment and training) to match 
a world where traditional ideas about middle- and high-skill occupations are 
changing fast. 
Perhaps most of all, the biggest challenge is encouraging a return to sustained 
productivity growth, which will contribute to rising wages, profit margins, and so greater 
investment and expanding opportunity. This point is fundamental to any policy discussion: 
improving labour market outcomes for individuals depends critically on creating the 
conditions for rising employer demands, as firms pursue opportunities for business 
growth. There are no magic wands that will lower unemployment, increase wages 
(especially for the low paid) and allow for more people to be challenged and promoted; all 
of these things depend on a successful business sector which embraces innovation and 
thrives on competition. 
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What do these challenges mean in practice? Sometimes, it is simpler to start with what 
they do not. As Lloyd and Mayhew (2010) point out, past attempts to move the UK labour 
market to deliver progression and higher wages by a general upskilling of those in the 
workforce without a qualification were not successful (see also Wolf et al., 2006). The 
polarisation of the labour market means that there continues to be demand for labour-
intensive, low-skill work, leaving aside the often multiple barriers facing those at the 
bottom of the labour market, not always so simply solved. 
None of this should be surprising if we consider the role of skills investments as 
complements to technological and organisational changes. For that reason, skills needs 
are often very particular to the issues in local or sectoral labour markets, and solutions 
need to respond to those. The weakness is in ensuring the level of coordination 
necessary to form those solutions. It is in tackling these coordination problems at local 
level that the Government is channelling investment through Local Enterprise 
Partnerships, as well as the Regional Growth Fund and City Deals. 
Economic policy plays a fundamental role in shaping employer behaviour and the 
operation of the labour market. Government’s role is to create the ‘framework conditions’ 
in which businesses can operate effectively, by ensuring macroeconomic stability and 
supporting growth. Since the recession, the Government has implemented a range of 
structural reforms which support increased business investment, improved productivity 
and wider economic recovery (HM Treasury, 2011). Industrial strategies for key sectors 
are being developed to support effective long-term cross-working between government 
and industry, including co-investment.  At the sectoral level, the Government has backed 
the Employer Ownership Pilots, to co-invest with employers, helping to create the 
infrastructure for lasting coordination improvements. These pilots have a wide variety of 
approaches, with some investing in recruitment, some in developing new qualifications, 
and some focused on training arrangements. 
So too, Lloyd and Mayhew (2010) make the point that it is only changes in the structure 
and design of jobs, emanating from the demand-side (the employer side) of the labour 
market that will make a difference to prospects for pay and progression. Here again, 
Government efforts to improve the business environment, improving infrastructure and 
making investment attractive through lower Corporation Tax and removing unnecessary 
regulation are important, as well as the more targeted supply-side actions to address 
business and housing finance. In the longer term, Government commitment to invest in 
science will ensure a flow of research and development knowledge with the potential for 
substantial ‘spillovers’ into business opportunity. 
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It is in the connection between education, training and employment institutions that a lot 
of work will need to be done. Analysis of labour market change in the US suggests that 
the contraction in middle-skill roles has limited opportunities most for young people and 
the currently not employed, and that the expansion of high-skill roles is concentrated on 
graduates (Smith, 2013). Acting to ensure that our vocational training model is fit-for-
purpose, attractive for young people, and delivers guaranteed high standards of skills, will 
be particularly important. That is why Government has invested heavily in 
Apprenticeships, is seeking to change them to improve their quality, and looking to 
employers to take the lead. 
At the macro level, the UK needs to create and retain high skill jobs. At the micro level, 
we need to ensure that these jobs are in high performing organisations. Just as success 
of UK firms will be the ultimate constraint to improved labour market performance, 
employer action will be needed to meet challenges successfully. Labour market 
outcomes are determined by firms deciding to employ and to invest in the talents of their 
employees. Policy can seek to shape the conditions, to make hiring and investment more 
likely to succeed. The more that we can assure employers that those conditions are 
there, especially by involving them in their development, the more likely it will be that 
policy measures will themselves be successful. 
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